This article was originally going to be a small section in my article ‘Some Notes on Hitler, Hacha and the Czechs‘ but ended up spiralling into its own piece. The information in this article isn’t comprehensive, I wanted to give light to some interesting facts and discussion, which was intended to be more of an outlet for me than it was an article.
Hitler’s approach to Czechoslovakia changed dramatically in a matter of ten days, from May 20th to May 30th 1938. On May 21st Czech President Edvard Beneš was mobilising 200,000 troops falsely claiming that Germany had mobilised her army to the Czech border. Beneš wanted to solicit support from Britain and France, at the same time giving himself an excuse to impose Martial Law in the Sudetenland in case the Sudeten Germans rose up against their Czech oppressors. Resulting from this provocation by the Czechs, Hitler was subsequently insulted by the foreign press, gloating that Hitler had been forced to “back down” in the face of Czech superiority; Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, even had the gall to tell Hitler “not to make the situation worse” as if any of this was Hitlers fault to begin with. Hitler then realised what the game was here, and who was being played.
This event is known as “The May Crisis”, which lead to the deconstruction of Czechoslovakia by way of the German annexation of the Sudetenland as a result of the Munich conference which was the last effort in 1938 to avert war in Europe. To the dismay of many it wasn’t Hitler who initiated the crisis or the end of Czechoslovakia, it was the Czechs themselves with help from the British quite apart from anything relating to Hitler.
The treatment of the British and the actions of the Czechs assured Hitler that no longer were the British impartial towards Germany, they took the side of the Czechs without a second thought. Hitler became convinced that whatever he did, he’d be forced into a war sooner or later. The German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop remarked in a way that seems prescient now:
“They (Britain) were only looking for an excuse, and, if the Austrian question will not serve as an excuse, the Sudeten German question will, or the Polish, or any other.”Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (ALLAN WINGATE, 1954), Pp. 49
This assessment would only cement itself as more and more accurate over the coming year or so.
During the Godesberg conference when Hitler was negotiating the return of the Sudetenland, Lord Halifax on September 22nd was pushing the British delegation to advise the Czechs to mobilise their armed forces, on September 23rd he asked again for the same thing, urging that “It is our suggestion to permit the Czech mobilisation as of 3.00 p.m.”. The French Prime Minister Daladier repeated the same demand as Halifax, stating that “the Czech mobilisation must no longer be postponed.”. All of this business being conducted behind the scenes flew in the face of Hitler’s peaceful intentions, not to mention those of the British.
While this deception was going on, Hitler told Neville Chamberlain that he would not be issuing marching orders against the Czechs while he was negotiating for a peaceful resolution. In the end however, the conference ended up being ruined by this British treachery, the Foreign Office in London gave the go ahead to the Czechs, and they mobilised 1.5 million of their soldiers, cutting off railway traffic to the Reich and denying Hitler’s mediation program. In the end Hitler again was blamed by the foreign press for the negotiations having fallen through. In the standard histories, we’re fed pretty much the same unaltered view of Hitler as was insisted on at the time – that Hitler was only playing at his desire for peace, but really wanted war.
This isn’t the case. Before the Godesberg meeting on September 23-24 1938, there was another meeting at the Berchtesgaden on September 15th, where in response to Neville Chamberlain’s emphasis that Germany must not settle her grievances by “force”, rightfully indignant, Hitler replied: “Force! Who speaks of force?”; his shock at Chamberlain’s insinuation that it was Germany who would resort to force was one that Hitler couldn’t have expected to get away with if he had actually no good reason to be angry that Chamberlain could accuse Germany, and by extension Hitler himself, of using “force”. After all it was Beneš who was applying force against the Germans in the Sudetenland, and it was he too that resorted to the use of force in response to his own fiction, claiming that Germany had mobilised her armed forces. Germany up until the Invasion of Poland had never used force on a single occasion.
Hitler finally stated: “I shall not put up with this any longer” exclaiming “I shall settle the question in one way or another.” Chamberlain subsequently threatened to leave the meeting, convinced that Hitler was going to act against the Czechs. He asked Hitler, perplexed as he was, why if this was the route he intended to go, had Hitler let him come to the Berchtesgaden in the first place? Hitler hesitated. To Paul Schmidt, his interpreter: “was the moment if he (Hitler) really wants to come to war”; but it did not, as Hitler backed down and calmly negotiated further with Chamberlain, showing very clearly, his sincerity for peace.
The Soviets too had a part to play, they assured the Czechs that if they denied Hitler’s programme and went to war, they would back them up in the armed conflict to follow even if the French didn’t fight. Only at the last moment was a war prevented by the actions of Mussolini proposing a joint conference which we now call “The Munich Conference”. Some will argue that by this time Hitler had nothing but aggression in mind, that he wanted to smash the Czechs. This is partially true, and I would be lying if I said Hitler probably didn’t want this. However it would also be a lie to say that Hitler had nothing but aggression in mind to deal with the Czech problem facing Germany, as it is also true that “Case Green”, the plan for the potential invasion of Czechoslovakia, was a bargaining chip, Hitler didn’t know how far he would go on the precipice of war. It must also be understood that there is a difference between wanting to smash your enemy, and whether or not you intend to do so. It was the Czechs themselves who forced Hitler to take this aggressive stance in the first place where he didn’t initially have a desire to be aggressive. What this shows us, is that far from Hitler realising some kind of long-term “plan”, he actually acted based on events that he could strategically use to his advantage, and when military conflict came up as a solution, it was always a prerequisite that war with anyone else, particularity Britain and France must be avoided. You can see, for example, on May 28th, when Hitler gathered his military staff to work out Case Green, that in case of potential military action against the Czechs, Hitler operated under the impression that such a war with the west would indeed be avoided if he were to act. The point is that he didn’t get the ball rolling on this issue and in the end he chose the peaceful route.
When the Polish conflict came around the British did the exact same thing. They lied, they sent secret messages, they ignored Polish mobilisations and overall did everything in their power to secure war with Germany on the side of Poland. Most astounding of all on September 2nd 1939, Ribbentrop telephoned the Reich press councillor of the German Embassy in London, Fritz Hesse, about a compromised peace to settle the Danzig/Polish question:
“The Führer is prepared to withdraw from Poland and to offer compensation for damage done thus far, on the condition that we get Danzig and the road through the Corridor, provided Britain takes on the role of mediator in the German-Polish conflict. You are authorised by the Führer to submit this proposal to the British Cabinet and to take up negotiations on this immediately.”Udo Walendy, Who Started the Second World War? (Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2014), Pp. 430
Hitler’s peace feelers were sincere, Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary at the German Foreign Office confirmed as much, writing in early October 1939:
‘The attempt to wind up the war now is for real. I myself put the chances at twenty percent, [Hitler] at fifty percent; his desire is 100 percent. If he obtained peace . . . it would eliminate the awkward decision as to how to reduce Britain by military means.’David Irving, Hitler’s War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 240
Hermann Göring in September reiterated the German peace feelers toward Britain via the neutral Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus; Germany would be willing to restore Polish sovereignty but would not give up the old German provinces. Hitler told Dahlerus on September 26th that if the British wanted to salvage Poland in any way they would have to make peace hastefully.
However, all of this was for naught. Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s closest collaborator in reply to the offer of Hesse that came through Ribbentrop on September 2nd proclaimed that “England is resolved upon war, and is no longer keen on a compromise”. This shouldn’t be a surprise. The British and later Americans as well, constantly demanded all or nothing from Germany; whether it was “unconditional surrender” or ultimatums demanding Germany should retreat from Poland, including the former German territories. The only outcome Germany could expect in accepting such an ultimatum would’ve been total capitulation. If the British weren’t going to negotiate seeing as they didn’t force Poland to negotiate before either, they certainly weren’t going to now after they declared war.
That’s the big problem here that exposes British intransigence. These “counter-offers” for peace on the part of Britain boiled down to a ridiculous demand: ‘withdraw from everything you took, none of which I have a chance in Hell to evict you from myself, and then we’ll talk about it’. This downright preposterous position held by the British was ill thought out if you want to pretend they had peace at heart. The only real conclusion is that peace was never an option to begin with, they held absolutely no cards that would justify such demands, nor could they honestly expect the Germans to accept them. The British threats and ultimatums cannot even be CONSIDERED attempts at a “negotiation”, because to negotiate you actually need to compromise and talk with your opponent, not just demand EVERYTHING from them and then say you’ll “negotiate” afterwards when the prerequisite for such a thing was getting everything you were going to demand in the first place! It’s insanity and only shows that the British position was one of war to begin with.
Think about it.
It was mighty convenient for the British to give a blank check to Poland and never encourage mediation. Not only did this move ensure Polish resistance to genuine German attempts at a compromise, but it also made the Germans more desperate and willing to use force, which of course they ended up using. This move against the Germans in itself had a propagandistic advantage for the British for multiple reasons. For one they could then claim that none of the negotiations were genuinely undertaken in good faith.
Because of the blank check the Brits could stand in the background and proclaim that “oh it’s not our fault we just want to protect Poland” – the first lie and move to incriminate Germany by framing the European scene in a way that doesn’t require the British to force their hand UNTIL Germany is inevitably forced to make a move; this would cast the shadow of aggressor over Germany, victim over Poland and “arbiter of peace” over Britain. The Next step was using the Polish show of force as a “defence” against Germany. You’ll see many people today claiming that the multiple Polish mobilisations (that constituted a declaration of war by the way) was simply because of the Polish need to defend themselves in case of an invasion from “big bad Germany”. So when the Germans finally had no options left and invaded Poland, the British and Poles could continue to deny any mediation attempts by using the traps previously set up (getting Germany to invade) to claim that they weren’t trustworthy and wouldn’t ever actually adhere to peace. I will discuss more of this later.
Hitler, even though he understood that Britain was driving Germany to war still seemed to think that they valued peace. This seems apparent to me because when he invaded Poland he offered them peace publicly and privately through his emissaries Ribbentrop and Dahlerus as we’ve already seen. Hitler spoke constantly about how he thought the British would perhaps only posture, feigning war, seeing as they actually couldn’t come to the aid of Poland but that peace could be attained later through those offers of peace he made. Evidently they didn’t want peace and unfortunately for the world, for our European Race this wasn’t the case.
On May 20-21 1938 Hitler was given draft orders for Case Green, preparations for a potential military conflict with Czechoslovakia. These draft orders were the result of a meeting between Hitler and Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel on April 21st. The opening line of these draft orders contained the sentence attributed to Hitler: “It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the immediate future . . . etc.” However, after the Weekend Crisis this opening line was changed to “It is my unshakeable resolve to smash Czechoslovakia by means of a military operation.” in the Final Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) directive and signed by Hitler on May 30th. It was changed due to the Czech mobilisation and their false claim that Hitler had mobilised and moved German units to the Czech border. David Irving confirms this change of wording. As does Hitler’s Chief of Operation Staff, Alfred Jodl:
After annexation of Austria, the Fuhrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L Ia of 19 April) reported to the Fuhrer on 21 April. The intention of the Fuhrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany’s self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuhrer which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore the new order is issued for Green, on 30 May . . .’Alfred Jodl diary entry, Quoted in, D.C. Watt, Hitler’s Visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis, Pp. 24-25
Keitel in his memoirs also confirms the change of wording:
On 20th May, Czechoslovakia for no reason at all and quite out of the blue announced the temporary mobilisation of her army, which could only be intended for Germanyís edification. Hitler returned to Berlin full of new plans and decisions. He announced he had no intention of accepting this renewed provocation from Czechoslovakia lying down or of letting them get away with it. He demanded we put ourselves on a war footing as quickly as possible – a demand which found tangible expression in his alteration of the directive’s opening sentence to read:Keitel Memoirs, Pp. 72
“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.”
The Jodl diary and the Keitel memoir both confirm the fact that Hitler had nothing but positive and peaceful restorative intentions toward Czechoslovakia before the aggressive actions of Edvard Beneš.
However, the “historian”, Donald Cameron Watt I think wrongly dismisses the Jodl diary entry when he says “it is undated and therefore ex post and not evidence”. The burden of proof is certainly on him to prove that the diary entry isn’t valid, he provides no proof. If you want to date the diary entry you need only juxtapose the contents of the entry and where in the diary it was written. Watt notes that the entry was placed after an entry on March 11th but before an entry on May 23rd, as we saw, Jodl mentions the Czech mobilisation of May 21st meaning the entry could only have been placed on May 22nd. The tense in which he refers to May 21 isn’t really discernible but it doesn’t matter considering those events would’ve had to already transpired thus were past tense. Or perhaps, due to Jodl’s reference to May 30th the diary entry had to have been written after the 22nd? It’s possible, however the wording of that part of the entry isn’t past tense – it says: “is issued for” not “was issued on”. So it could’ve been written before May 30th as well. Still, what difference does this make? Not any, there’s nothing to indicate that this entry isn’t authentic, if it weren’t then we must also doubt the overall authenticity of Jodl’s diary. The whole entry itself is written as a recounting of recent events up to May 30th, depending on your interpretation of that part of the entry it would still be Jodl’s recounting of the May crisis after it had occurred. So what does it matter if it was ex post? Diary entries are quite literally that. The point being that it doesn’t matter. Even if it was dated what substantial difference could be discerned forcing it to be declared illegitimate and “ex post”? Or is it the simple lack of any date? This does not seem like enough evidence to throw out the entry.
It’s worth pointing out that the same logic isn’t applied consistently to other “key” documents that supposedly prove Hitler’s wickedness. There are 6 documents, all of which have either been discredited, misinterpreted, are incomplete, flawed in some way ultimately lacking any real credibility as to be rendered useless to anyone except desperate conformist historians that need to paint Hitler as guilty of “starting” the Second World War. That claim alone, even if these documents were legitimate doesn’t even stand up to basic contemplation as I will show in a coming article.
But why am I talking about this? Because this little schism about the May Crisis and Hitler’s actions show us how Hitler went about developing his attitudes to foreign policy, and in this case, towards Czechoslovakia. The debate is controversial between who D.C. Watt calls the “Indeterminists” and the “determinists”. The Determinists are those “historians” who claim that Hitler followed some kind of long term program. The Indeterminists are those historians like A.J.P. Taylor who didn’t blindly follow the Nuremberg line like the post-war court Historians who believed in the “Nazi conspiracy and aggression” charges. This was a real conspiracy theory that conveniently tied all the blame into a nice little bow for Germany to wear. Nobody could complain of course, the Allies made a good job of making sure the entire world hated the National Socialists.
Watt evidently didn’t think the diary entry was enough to prove the “Indeterminist” position correct, what they really needed he said was “a reason for Hitler’s indecision before the week-end crisis, if the draft of 20 May is to be taken as evidence of this indecision. The aim of this paper is to argue that just such a reason exists – in the unsuccessful outcome of Hitler’s visit to Rome in May 1938.” Watt successfully does this, my only critique of his otherwise excellent paper was simply on the diary entry. Even now I don’t rightly know why the change of phrase is significantly important. Hitler had it changed according to David Irving, I haven’t seen it alleged that Hitler disagreed with the initial opening phrasing, or that he didn’t even see it. After all, Watt in his paper mentions that “the draft orders of 20 May were sent to Hitler by Keitel and cannot therefore be taken as representing Hitler’s intentions in May, since on the evidence of Keitel’s covering letter they were drawn up on the basis of a conference held between Keitel and Hitler in April” the keyword being May, and of course, that was Hitler’s prior decision before signing off on the more aggressive directive. Bear in mind there was no date for attack on any of the drafts, even the one Hitler did sign on May 30th. So the fact that Hitler held the position from the initial draft of May 20 isn’t really in dispute.
Czechoslovakia, at the end of the day, was a state which couldn’t exist at all if Germany was to truly be secure from her hostile adversaries that desired her unconditional destruction. Not because she was “totalitarian” – that was merely the popular excuse to justify the actions taken by the Democracies. The seeds of the resultant Second world War stretched back much further. For centuries, the civil servants and politicians of Britain had viewed Germany as a long-standing threat, and they had desired the eradication of the German “Reich idea” for decades; this war was merely their way of dealing with what they saw as this “idea”, and some of them were fairly clear about this. For the sake of destroying the German Reich, Britain refused peace and would not grant it, no matter what Hitler offered. So, the question must be asked – what was Hitler supposed to do? To me the answer is simple. He was to do all he could, for the sake of Germany, to secure her borders and her independence even if it mean’t being harsh from time to time. This is what any responsible statesman and Nationalist should do, even if the world hated him for it.
Czechoslovakia has been described by many as “a dagger pointed at Germany’s heart”, and Adolf Hitler, Führer of the German people, faced that dagger bravely, with confidence and commitment. Weaker men fell at his mercy and complained bitterly for it. But that was their own inadequacy. Hitler was indeed a man possessed by a mission, he was also the representative of a goal that encompassed all of Europe; a patchwork of states, embroiled in ethnic conflict should not, in any circumstances, have gotten in the way of this mission for Germany and for Europe. Remember. The Czech-Slovak state didn’t even survive after Hitler’s time, it doesn’t exist today, so to scorn Hitler for pioneering the inevitable is hardly fair, he should instead be praised.
 David Irving, Hitler’s War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 91 also see Norman Stone, Hitler (Little, Brown and Company, 1980), Pp. 80
 Ibid., Stone, op cit., Pp. 80
 Irving, op cit., Pp. 92
 A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Pp. 8. Also, Stone, op cit., Pp. 80
 Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (ALLAN WINGATE, 1954), Pp. 49
 Udo Walendy, Who Started the Second World War? (Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2014), Pp. 111
 John Toland, Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography, (Anchor Books, Paperback Edition, 1992), Pp. 475
 Walendy, op cit. Pp. 111
 John Toland, op cit. Pp. 466
 Ibid. Pp. 464
 Walendy, op cit., Pp. 400, 429
 “The Führer is prepared to move out of Poland and to offer reparation damages provided that we receive Danzig and a road through the Corridor, if England will act as mediator in the German-Polish conflict. You are empowered by the Führer to submit this proposal to the British cabinet and initiate negotiations immediately.” Hesse was flabbergasted. Had a specter of things to come finally dawned on the Führer at the last moment? Or was it just a charade to see how far the British would compromise with the sword of war dangling overhead? Hesse asked Ribbentrop to repeat the offer. He did, adding, “So there will be no misunderstanding, point out again that you are acting on the express instructions of Hitler and that this is no private action of mine.” – John Toland, Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography, (Anchor Books, Paperback Edition, 1992), Pp. 573
 David Irving, Hitler’s War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 240
 Udo Walendy, Who Started the Second World War? (Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2014), Pp. 430
 Hitler’s Peace Offers Vs Unconditional Surrender
 “Hitler’s (peace) proposal was eventually rejected on the grounds that Germany’s forces would have to be withdrawn from all occupied territory before Britain was prepared to discuss peace – a demand that Hitler was sure to reject.” See, Martin Allen, The Hitler/Hess Deception (Harper Collins, paperback, 2004), Pp. 81, for the peace proposal see,: Ibid., Pp. 78 and Irving, op cit., Pp. 329-330
 D.C. Watt (see below) says Hitler received the orders on May 20th, while David Irving (also see below) says Hitler received them on May 21st.
 David Irving, Hitler’s War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 86 and Donald C. Watt, Hitler’s Visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli, Pp. 25 in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), Pp. 23-32
 Ibid., Irving, op cit. Pp. 91, Ibid., D.C. Watt, Pp. 24, Stone, Hitler, Pp. 80 and In The Service of The Reich: The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel (Focal Point Publications, 2003), Translated by David Irving, Introduced and Edited by Walter Görlitz, Pp. 70
 David Irving records the initial interim order phrase being “It is not my intention to destroy Czechoslovakia in the immediate future by military action unless provoked . . . or unless political events in Europe create a particularly favourable and perhaps unrepeatable climate for doing so” on Page 91 and ” “It is my unshakeable resolve to smash Czechoslovakia by means of a military operation.” on Page 94 in Hitler’s War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002). As you might expect, the alternate more “aggressive” phrasing gives some peace of mind to detractors, and it does wonders for the historian who will ignore Hitler’s initial, much more moderate position of that April before the aggression undertaken by the Czechs with aid from Britain. However, Czechoslovakia was not the territorial dispute in which Britain and her allies could use to start waging an aggressive war against Hitler’s Germany; another excuse was needed only after Hitler had managed to sew together more German territory, amassing more resources that Germany’s enemies could point to, and make sure Hitler seemed insatiable. Only then could a war become justifiable, once Germany’s enemies ensured their public that Hitler was unstoppable, it then mean’t he must be stopped. A very convenient way to wage war and still retain the veil of victimhood. Hitler unlike the Democracies, was actually very honest in regards to his aims, his actions reflected this fact. Hitler unfortunately misjudged the nature of the Democracies. I will discuss this aspect in another article.
 Ibid. In The Service of The Reich, Pp. 70
 D.C. Watt, op cit., Pp. 24-25
 Ibid., Pp. 25
 Ibid., Pp. 24
 Walendy, Pp. 445-466, also see Gerd Schultze Rhonhof, 1939: The War That Had Many Fathers (LuLu Publishing, English Edition, 2011), Pp. 361-415
 Ibid. – Walendy notes that “On all of the IMT’s “key documents” dealing with Hitler’s non-public addresses, their origin, authenticity, contents and date are so very controversial that every objective expert from the outset – i.e. immediately after their “discovery” in the year 1945 – should have rejected “these documents” as forgeries and falsifications, which in part has happened already, albeit couched in diplomatically guarded form, before the Nuremberg Tribunal.” (Walendy, op cit., Pp. 448)
 Ibid. – My Coming Article has a lot of its body already written (as of writing this footnote, March 21st 2020), but i’m yet to decide what direction it will go and whether to what extent I will cover some of the documents. Although I can’t help but feel it isn’t too important. I’ve already included in this article a tiny bit of my thoughts that I want to include in the forthcoming one, so it might get a bit repetitive at one point or another.
 D.C. Watt, op cit., Pp. 25
 Irving, op cit., Pp. 94
 Martin Allen, op cit., Pp. 79-80
 Walendy, op cit., Pp. 99, Hermann Göring once said “Just look at the shape of Czechoslovakia on the map! Is it not a challenge to common sense? It is Europe’s appendix. There will have to be an operation!”, Charles Bewley, Hermann Göring and the Third Reich: A Biography Based on Family and Official Records (The Devin-Adair Company, 1962), Pp. 238 and Göring was right.